Abstract. We investigatea simple form of parametricity, based on adding \abstract" copies of pre-existing types. Connections are made with the Reynolds-Ma theory of parametricity by logical relations, with the theory of parametricity via dinaturality, and with the categorical notion of equivalence.
Introduction
In his fundamental paper on the notion of parametricity in connection with type theories Rey83], John Reynolds links the notion of parametricity rmly to the notion of data abstraction. This, unlike Strachey's earlier characterization via algorithm re-use, is a need-driven analysis. We need things to be parametric because otherwise our data abstractions will no longer be abstract. In his subsequent paper with Ma MR91] , two further points are made. One is that the problems reside more at the level of parametrized types than at the level of the quanti ed polymorphic types, and the other is that the notion of parametricity is not absolute, but relative. The Ma-Reynolds work produces a notion of parametricity de ned relative to some category from which logical relations are taken. The larger that category, the stronger the constraints imposed by parametricity.
This notion of relativity also makes some sense in the type abstraction setting. The stronger our mechanisms for abstraction, the stronger the form of parametricity we will require.
Our purpose in this paper is to investigate more or less thoroughly a very simple form of parametricity, and to link it to a form of data abstraction. We shall also link it to certain other forms of parametricity proposed in the literature. The form of parametricity we shall be looking at can be expressed by saying that we wish to have the freedom to declare \abstract" copies of pre-existing types. The abstraction lies in our not caring which type we use to implement our copy, so long as it has the 1 Functoriality
The categorical analysis of notions of parametricity is deeply embedded in the concepts of functoriality and naturality (this, in a sense, is precisely what these notions, and hence the whole of category theory, were invented to embody). So when, as a category theorist, one hears that a type is supposed to behave parametrically, one immediately tries to formalise this by requiring that the type be interpreted as a functor. It is obvious what to take as the codomain of this functor: the category of (closed) types. The domain is less obvious, and in any case clearly depends on what one is parametrising over. In the case of the second-order lambda calculus, and where the type in question has one free variable, one's rst attempt is most likely to be to try to use the category of closed types again. However, even at this early stage of playing with de nitions, one should also be conscious that there is always a degenerate form, in which no parametricity constraints are imposed. This is modeled by taking a discrete category as domain (this has no non-identity morphisms, so functoriality and naturality constraints are satis ed trivially). Now, at least in the case of the second-order lambda calculus, it is well Parametricity as Isomorphism 3 known that the rst approach fails, but the second succeeds (and gives us the so-called Moggi-Hyland interpretation in which universal types are interpreted as products over Type). We were, however, quite surprised to realise that we had no clear picture why the rst approach failed. Let's be a little more speci c. We are trying to interpret the category of C-parametrised types by the category Cat(C; Type) of functors and natural transformations. Now, limits in a functor category are calculated pointwise. So the functor category inherits them from Type. This means that if Type has products, then so does Cat(C; Type). (Note: this remains true for monoidal structures).
However, the analysis above breaks down for function spaces. This is not because of the natural contraviariance of the function space in its rst argument (at least not directly), but has more to do with the way function spaces in functor categories are calculated.
We recall that Cat(C; T) need not be a cartesian closed category simply because T is. However, if C is small, and the codomain is Set, then it is well known that the functor category is cartesian closed (it is a topos of pre-sheaves). The reason is that we can use the Yoneda lemma to calculate the function spaces. We shall use arrow notation, X ! Y ], to represent the internal hom. If F and G are functors C ! T, then their internal hom, F ! G], is also a functor. Its value at the object C of C can be calculated as:
' Set C (C(C; ?) F; G) the set of natural transformations. Now, this set of natural transformations can be calculated via a limit, the equalizer of
where the two arrows correspond to the di erent ways of going round the naturality square for an archetypical f. We have put the argument like this in order to make it obvious that it extends to the case when C is T-enriched. In the type-theoretic setting with which we are chie y concerned, we can think of enrichment as meaning that the \hom-sets" in C are types.
This gives us a number of examples at the expense of a restriction on the parametrising category, albeit one we shall be seeing again later. However, if T is su ciently complete, we can sometimes get function spaces in its functor categories by what amounts to brute force (viz. Freyd's adjoint functor theorem).
We are often concerned with the case that T is a small complete category (in some locally cartesian closed category C Thus, the problem is not primarily the existence of function spaces in the functor categories. The problem turns out to be the fact that these function spaces are almost never calculated pointwise. This is disastrous.
Pointwise function spaces
If we are modeling parametrised types functorially, then we need function spaces to be calculated pointwise. Suppose F and G are C-parametrised types. In type-theoretic terms they are given to us by judgements \X : C`F : Type" and \X : C`G : Type". Thus we can form \`X : C` F ! G] : Type". If F and G are modeled by functors, and values by arbitrary natural transformations, then F ! G] is modeled by the exponential in the functor category. This is forced by the same argument that for the theory of simple types tells us that the interpretation of a function type must be the exponential in the category. Instantiation at a particular object in C is modeled by evaluation at that object. Thus, given that C is an object of C, we can form \`F(C) : Type". We want our type formation rules to commute with instantiation, so that This certainly holds true when C is a discrete category. It also holds more generally, when C is a groupoid (i.e. every morphism in C is an isomorphism).
Somewhat surprisingly there is a partial converse. Proposition 2.1. If C is a T-enriched category, and T is su ciently complete for Cat(C; T) to have exponentials then these are calculated pointwise if and only if C is a groupoid.
Here we again meet the condition that C be T-enriched. Note that under these circumstances a su cient condition for Cat(C; T) to have exponentials is that T has (binary) equalizers, binary products, (so all nonempty nite limits), and products indexed by ob(C) and mor(C).
A full proof of this is once again given in our FRR92b] . Note that the converse fails in the absence of the condition that C be T-enriched.
To exhibit a counterexample, note that in many toposes it is possible to nd objects A and B such that the only maps from A to B are constant, i.e. the map : B ! B A , mapping an element b to the constant function K b , is an isomorphism. In such a case we say that A is orthogonal to B. An instance of this occurs in the e ective topos, when A is any uniform object (these are the quotients of ::-sheaves) with at least two distinct global sections (A could be , or rS for any set S with two elements or more), and when B can be any Per. For a detailed discussion see HRR90b] .
We can construct a one-object category out of A, by picking a global section, and taking the free monoid generated by the object A subject to the given global section being the identity. Let's call this A. Let T be the internal category of Per's (or, indeed, any full subcategory). A functor from A to T is given by the choice of an object X in T, and a homomorphism of monoids A ! T(X; X). Now, since X is a Per, so is the hom-set T(X; X). Moreover, the map from A is determined by its restriction to A (since it's a homomorphism of monoids). Since A is orthogonal to T(X; X), this restriction must be a constant map, and since A contains the identity of the monoid, must map onto the identity of X. It follows that the whole of A is mapped onto the identity of X. In other words, Cat(A; T)) = T, and hence function spaces are calculated pointwise. global element is isomorphic to the unit type (and consequently has only one element). So this is not particularly useful! However, as we remarked above, we have a degenerate form of parametricity, which corresponds to using the discrete category on the objects of T (a groupoid since the only morphisms are identities). If we want to push the paradigm as far as we can, we have to nd some groupoid canonically associated with T. There are two possible ways to go. One is to force every morphism in T to be an isomorphism. This is useless. It amounts to taking only those functors for which the image of any morphism is an isomorphism. This does not even include the identity functor on T, the interpretation of a single type variable.
The other possibility is to take the largest subcategory of T, all of whose maps are isomorphisms. We shall call this T iso . This, in contrast, does turn out to give models of the second-order lambda calculus. The same de nition has also been proposed by Phoa Pho91] , under the name of \the invariant interpretation".
In this interpretation, types with n free type variables are interpreted as functors T n iso ! T, and values by using arbitrary natural transforma- At the value level, substitution is handled by composition of natural transformations. So, for example if X 1 ; : : :; X n ; x : B`e : C; and X 1 ; : : :; X n ; y : A`e 0 : B; then X 1 ; : : :; X n ; y : A`e x 7 ! e 0 ] : C; is interpreted by e e 0 : A ! C. If T has these limits, then the sole remaining requirement, the BeckChevalley conditions, certainly hold, at least up to isomorphism. If we take the limit to be the one given by a functor Let's concentrate for the moment on the case that T is a small category in a topos (we recall that Pitts has proved a completeness theorem for such models of the second-order lambda calculus Pit87]). Now, if we interpret types with free type variables in the MoggiHyland-Pitts style, simply as families of types indexed by ob(T), then quanti cation is interpreted as product over the objects of T.
If we replace T by an equivalent T', then a couple of things might happen. First, although, since it is equivalent to T, T' has ob(T)-indexed products, it may not have ob(T')-indexed products. Hence T' may not furnish a model for polymorphism in this sense. Second, even if T' does have ob(T')-indexed products, they are most unlikely to be isomorphic to ob(T)-indexed products. Thus, although T' furnishes a model for polymorphism, it is not equivalent to that provided by T. Both of these possibilities seem undesirable, and it is easy to cook up Per-related examples in which they actually happen.
However, if we insist on functoriality of types, and naturality of values with respect to isomorphisms, then neither of these possibilities arises. However, there is also a form of converse to this. The form of parametricity we are using seems, in a certain sense, to be as weak as possible subject to the requirement that model structure is preserved by categorical equivalence.
Suppose 
?
If we do this for all equivalences, and take the xed points, then we are left with lim ? F, where the limit is taken for F as a functor T iso ! T.
We can, however, tell a somewhat more convincing story. We shall begin by observing that we can argue that the interpretation of 8X:F(X)
should be as a subobject of the product Q X: F(X). It should consist of those tuples which are, in a suitable sense, \parametric". Now, Reynolds has proposed that the notion of parametricity is linked to type abstraction. What is parametrised over, or abstracted from, is a set of allowed implementations. In his 1983 paper, Rey83], Reynolds proposes rst a form of abstract type in which one is allowed to declare an abstract type, with no constructors or destructors, or anything to link it to pre-existing types. This can be implemented by giving any (concrete) type. He then goes on to extend this to types with access functions, but no equations between these functions. These can be implemented by giving a type, together with random functions of the appropriate types. What we are doing in this paper, is, in e ect, looking at a di erent, and rather trivial form of type abstraction. We are allowed to introduce an abstract type together with access functions which set up an isomorphism between our new type and a given pre-existing type. In other words we can take abstract copies of types we have already got. An allowable implementation for an abstract copy of type A consists of a type B, together with inverse isomorphisms A ?
?! B.
We shall discuss this from a linguistic point of view later, but semantically, we shall model it by saying that we are allowed to extend our category of types T, to a larger category C. So we have an inclusion i : T ! C. This is full and faithful, and since everything in C is supposed to be a copy of something in T, it is also essentially surjective. In other words it is part of an equivalence. Now, the process of implementation involves choosing an implementation in T for each type in C (with types coming from T being implemented by themselves). Thus we shall think of an equivalence T i ? ?! C such that i = Id T as an implementation of C.
Our abstraction principle is that it is impossible to distinguish between di erent implementations. Now, if e : 8X:F(X), we must interpret e in C. In T, e is given by a tuple (e A ) A2T . We must nd a tuple (e B ) B2C . The obvious way to do this is to use the implementation of C, and de ne e B to be the unique element of F(B) mapped onto e (B) by the implementation. More formally, we obtain a map i(
B commute, where the lower horizontal map is that obtained canonically from the equivalence.
Our parametricity requirement is that this interpretation be independent of the choice of implementation. Lemma 4.1. Suppose T is a category, and that (e A ) A2ob(T) is a cone over (F(A)) A2ob(T) , with vertex I. Then the lifting of e to a cone over (F(B)) B2ob(C) with vertex i(I) is independent of the choice of implementation of C, for any essentially surjective inclusion i : T ! C, if and only if e is a cone over F : T iso ! T. Proof One direction is obvious. For the other we in fact need only consider the category C, whose objects are isomorphisms in T, and whose morphisms are commutative squares. The inclusion i : T ! C sends A to (Id A : A ! A). e must be stable under the two implementations C ! T given by domain and codomain.
2 Thus, functoriality with respect to isomorphism gives the weakest form of parametricity which respects this form of abstraction.
We can view this as an \external" way of expressing parametricity. We use a family of possible extensions of our collection of types by a new \abstract" type to de ne our notion of parametricity. We believe that it must be possible to extend this approach to other forms of abstraction worthy of the name. Doing this, of course, involves looking at some other relation between categories than equivalence.
Logical relations and dinaturality
In this section we shall explore the connection between logical relations and dinaturality, and then go on to investigate how they both relate to our present framework.
The use of some form of logical relations to formalise the notion of parametricity has been proposed several times, and with varying degrees of abstraction, most notably in the work of Reynolds and his student Ma, Rey83, MR91] .
The use of dinaturality has been proposed by Bainbridge, Freyd, Girard, Scedrov, and Scott, BFSS90, GSS91].
On an abstract level, the idea behind the use of logical relations is that given an intepretation of the second-order lambda calculus, it is possible to form a category whose objects are (say) n-ary relations, and in which the morphisms come form morphisms between the types on which the relations are de ned. Under not too ferocious conditions, analogous to the kind of completeness condition we have not thought twice about using already in this paper, it is possible to de ne a way of parametrising types so that this category also carries structure which turns it into a model of the secondorder lambda calculus, for details see MR91] . If the interpretation of polymorphism in this model is suitably related to that in the original one, then the model is said to be parametric. Concretely, this comes down to saying that the interpretations of parametrised terms at n di erent types have to satisfy certain n-ary relations.
The abstract form of the dinaturality approach is to represent a type with m free type variables as a functor (T T op ) m ?! T;
and an element as a dinatural transformation. Thus, the contravariance of the function space in its rst argument is dealt with by decoupling covariant and contravariant occurrences of the type variables. There are, however, problems with this approach in general caused by the fact that dinaturals do not compose. These approaches are su ciently di erent for it to seem very di cult to relate them in their most abstract form. We can however ask whether they are related for the types of the pure second-order lambda calculus.
Suppose T(X) is a type of the pure second-order lambda calculus (with constant ground types), and that we are dealing with binary logical relations. Then from a relation R A B, we get a relation T(R) T(A) T(B). This is de ned by induction on the structure of T, as follows: It is natural to ask whether these two notions are equivalent, and then to try to prove this by induction on the structure of the expression T. Most of the cases in this induction are ne, but it turns out that there are problems with the function space constructor.
To see this, let us suppose that the notions of parametricity and dinaturality with respect to f coincide for the types F(X) and G(X). Suppose commutes. By our assumption about F it follows that they are also parametric.
Since e A and e B are parametric, it follows that e A (F(f; A)(u)) and e B (F(B; f)(u) are parametric too (by de nition of logical relations for the function space). Hence, since dinaturality and parametricity coincide for G, G(A; f)(e A (F(f; A)(u))) = G(f; B)(e B (F(B; f)(u)): In other words, the hexagon above commutes as required.
The problems arise when attempting the converse: showing that dinaturality implies parametricity. Suppose we are given two elements u A and u B of F(A; A) and F(B; B), respectively, which are parametric. By assumption, they are also dinatural. This tells us that F(A; f)(u A ) = F(f; B)(u B ). However, in order make use of the hexagon above, we need to know that u A and u B come from the same element of F(B; A). Demanding this condition in general is equivalent to requiring that the square given above for F be a weak pullback. This is not in general the case. This does not quite su ce to establish the inequivalence of the dinaturality and the logical relations form of parametricity, since, at the least, one is quanti ed with respect to all relations, and the other with respect to all maps. But, it is very suggestive.
Moreover, although we might hope that the analysis above would allow us to prove that parametricity implied dinaturality, that is not the case either. Our proof required that dinaturality for F implied parametricity. Thus we can get at most one or two steps up the type hierarchy.
More speci cally, our proof shows that if parametricity implies dinaturality for G, and parametricity is equivalent to dinaturality for F, then We now turn our attention to the case when f is an isomorphism. The situation here is much happier, both as regards the relationship between the di erent paradigms of parametricity, and to some extent in the behaviour of the paradigms themselves (transformations which are dinatural with respect to isomorphisms compose, unlike those which are dinatural with respect to arbitrary maps). Suppose G : T either as a dinaturality hexagon for F and G, or as a naturality square for F 0 and G 0 . Thus, the notions of naturality with respect to isomorphisms, and dinaturality with respect to isomorphisms coincide, and do so in full generality. (Note that extending this equivalence to polymorphic types entails a small change in their interpretation; instead of taking the end with respect to all maps, we only take it with respect to isomorphisms).
We can not get quite this generality when it comes to logical relations, but we can follow through the inductive de nition of the logical relation T(R), to discover that if R is the graph of an isomorphism f, then T(R) is the graph of the isomorphism T(f). Thus, again, the two concepts coincide.
Abstract types by copying
In his 1983 paper Reynolds introduces abstract types by means of a \lettype" construct. Speci cally he uses lettype X = A in e where X is a type variable, A is a type expression, and e is an expression which is well-typed in a context in which no individual variable has a type which depends on the type variable X. The type of the expression is B X 7 ! A], where B is the type of e. Reynolds goes on to observe that no additional strength is obtained by extending this to include access functions for X, since lettype X = A with x:F(X) = e 0 in e can be interpreted as (lettype X = A in x : F(X):e)(e 0 ): We can, to some extent, think of the rst form as being the declaration of an abstract type X, which can be implemented by any concrete type A. Reynolds proves that a relation between implementations extends to a relation which is satis ed by any term (his \Pure Type De nition Theorem"). However, it must be admitted that certain points of this construction are not completely clear to us. For example, it is not clear whether X is free in the lettype construct.
One of the ways in which pure type theories di er from programming languages is that they have no de nitional mechanism to allow the binding of values (or types) to identi ers. So where, in a functional programming language a program consists of a sequence of declarations setting up an environment, followed by an expression to be evaluated in that environment, a program in a pure type theory is represented simply by an expression to be evaluated. Of course this expression must contain explicitly code that the programming language can refer to implicitly. As an example, the trivial ML program Operationally, these are not necessarily exact equivalents to the original code. When the original code is compiled, sq is evaluated to canonical form before the commencement of the evaluation of \3*sq". In the typetheoretic translation this may or may not be so, depending on the order of evaluation in use. This is perhaps a rather picky point, but one can see some of the same issues arising in connection with the confusion over the syntax for abstract types. So in normal programming it is quite usual to declare an abstract type (stack say) and then write a program to construct one. Whether it is a useful end in itself to construct a particular abstract stack is another matter. This is an argument supporting the view that X should occur free in the lettype construct, i.e. that the type of e should be allowed to contain free occurrences of X.
On the other hand, \let" is usually used as a binder. So one expects X to be bound in the lettype construct.
We take the view that type declarations are intended to enlarge the range of types available, and that it is possible to return and print out an element of an abstract type, in the same way that it is possible to return and print out an element of a concrete one. The only thing that prevents this is the absence of a type-dependent print function, and there is no reason why we should not supply this. After all the compiler writers have already supplied type-dependent print functions for integers, reals, strings, and the rest. However, we should not cause confusion by using something that looks like a binder.
Moreover, linguistic constructs to support modularity have moved on from abstract types. So it seems that we should make an e ort to deal more directly with something like interface speci cations as in Extended ML ST86]. What we need is a kind of abstract structure mechanism.
A full detailed solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this paper, so we shall merely make a nod in its direction. We adopt a simple one-level approach. The basic idea is to use the context to allow us to declare (and implement) structures.
First of all, as far as we are concerned a structure speci cation will consist of a list of names for types a list of names for operations, with types a collection of axioms which the structure must satisfy. A convenient way of setting up the second order lambda calculus is to use judgements of the form X 1 ; : : :; X n ; x 1 : 1 ; : : :; x m : m`e : where \X 1 ; : : :; X n " is a list of type variables, \x 1 : 1 ; : : :; x m : m " is a list of bindings of individual variables to types, e is an expression, and is its type. We add a third component to the context: a list of structure declarations. So our judgements will now take the form ?; ; `e :
where is a list of structure declarations.
It is useful to assume that as well as being given sets of type and individual variables, we are given sets of type and individual identi ers to use in structures (though the structures themselves will be anonymous). This removes one source of name clashes, and avoids some problems with weakening rules.
So, if we have a valid context \?; ; ", then we can enlarge it by adding the new structure 8 < :
A(X a1 ; : : :; X ak ) type, : : :; f 1 : 1 , : : :; axioms : : :
where the A and f are taken from the new identi ers, excluding those already used in , the X i are type variables listed in ?, and the i are types constructible from the type variables listed in ?, and the types listed in the other structures in . We place no restriction on the possible form of the axioms that these structures are to be required to satisfy. The intention behind allowing A(X a1 ; : : :; X ak ), and not just A, is that A be allowed to depend on types \X a1 ; : : :; X ak ".
We must also add rules to say that if A is a type declared in a structure, then A is a usable type ?; `A : Type; and if f is a value declared in a structure to have type then f is a usable value ?; ; `f : : So far, this allows us to use types and values from structures without commiting ourselves to implementations of the structures. In other words, the structures are treated abstractly. However, in order to get working code we need to supply implementations of the structures used. We do this by attaching them to the declarations.
?; ; ; S = I`e : where \S = I" is of the form 8 < : Of course we require that the types of the expressions used to implement the values f are compatible with the types used to implement the sorts A. We also require that the implementation satisfy the axioms listed in the declaration of the structure.
So if ?; : `e : , then the semantics of e is de ned only relative to implementations of the structures in . Once these implementations are given, the semantics of e is given by the obvious concretion. That is, we use e A 7 ! A ; : : :; f i 7 ! e i ; : : :] : A 7 ! A ]:
In this paper, we shall only be interested in a special case, even of this grossly oversimpli ed view of the use of structures. This is the case in which we are only allowed to introduce structures containing one new type, and an isomorphism between that and some speci ed type. We insist, moreover, that all type variables appearing free in B be listed iñ X, in order to make sure that this does not place an implicit constraint on the interpretation of B for di erent values of its type variables. We shall call this extension, \second order lambda calculus with abstract copies".
So an interpretation of this structure consists of a type isomorphic to B together with a designated pair of inverse isomorphisms.
Suppose we write S for the structure given above. If we have two di erent implementations of S, say then is functorial with respect to isomorphisms in the interpretation of A. Let's write e I and e I 0 for the interpretation of e relative to implementations I and I 0 . We shall say that the model satis es the \abstraction criterion" if the interpretation of any expression e is natural with respect to isomorphisms in the interpretation of A, i.e. if the value e I is functorially related to e I 0 : e I 0 = (f 0 g)(e I ): Note that if e and do not depend on A, then this becomes e I 0 = e I : In other words, the intepretation of e is independent of the implementation of A, which is to say that as far as e is concerned, A is abstractly interpreted.
We can now state the analogue of the \abstraction theorem" proved by Reynolds in Rey83]. Proof As in Reynolds' result, the proof is by structural induction on e.
Note that this result, in contrast to the full abstraction result in the next section, refers only to terms of the pure calculus. 2 7 A full abstraction theorem
Suppose we start with a model for the second order lambda calculus, which we extend to carry an interpretation of the syntax of the calculus with abstract copies. Part of the extension process involves extending the interpretation of polymorphic values to the new abstract types. If we demand that all the resulting model satis es our abstraction criterion, then this places a constraint on the interpretation of the polymorphic types in the original model. This is a kind of full abstraction theorem. We are using facts about one interpretation to characterise the kind of element allowed in a denotational model. It is usual in this kind of result to have use contexts which produce some \observable". In this case, we are using any element of a concrete type as an observable. We believe this makes sense because what we are trying to do is take a model of \concrete" types, load a notion of \abstract" type on top of that, demand that the \abstract" types behave abstractly, and investigate what constraints this places on the original model. We are not trying to investigate extensionality properties of the original model compared to some collection of ground types. 2 Thus functoriality with respect to isomorphism is the least constraint we can impose on parametrized types which ensures that our copies are indeed treated abstractly.
On not using Per
In this section we investigate the pro's and con's of using Per-like models to investigate forms of parametricity. More is known in the context of these models than in any other, but that is still not very much.
We have known for some time that the interpretations of some of the algebraic types in the classical Per model of the natural numbers were the initial algebras (see HRR90a, FRR92a] ). This has been proposed as a test of the degree of parametricity of a model. However, the proofs at least seem to depend on the particular realizability algebra on which the model is based (natural numbers with Kleene application). This raises the unpleasant possibility that the degree of parametricity of these models may depend on the underlying realizability algebra.
We do not know whether uniform families of maps are always dinatural. (This is exactly equivalent to the coincidence of the dinaturality interpretation and the Moggi-Hyland interpretation). However, it is not hard to see that a family of maps which is natural with respect to isomorphisms is dinatural with respect to all maps (and thus the naturality with respect to isomorphism and dinaturality interpretations coincide). Proof We recall that naturality and dinaturality coincide for isomorphisms. We also recall that the set of maps with respect to which a given family is dinatural is closed under composition. The proof is now immediate from Freyd's observation that maps in Per factor as an isomorphism, followed by a map realised by the identity, followed by a second isomorphism.
2 Note that this does not depend on the underlying realizability algebra. A similar, but slightly more complex, proof shows that if a transformation between internal functors is natural with respect to isomorphisms, then it is natural with respect to all maps. For details see Freyd et al. FRR92b] .
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Edmund Robinson Also, we should note that although we do not know whether families in Per are automatically dinatural, the main result in FRR92a] is that there are large and well-behaved subcategories of Per for which this is so. For these categories, three of the four interpretations of polymorphism we have been considering coincide, the exception being the Reynolds logical relations form.
Finally, we note that we know next to nothing about the Reynolds or Ma-Reynolds approaches in this context.
Towards a more general theory
The theory we have proposed has some features which we expect will generalise to a full-blown theory, and some which we expect won't. As we stated above, we would like to see some external form of semantics for type abstraction in which the abstract types are interpreted as elements of an enlarged universe of types. We would also like to see a relationship between a linguistic theory and rules for reasoning about abstract types, and the parametric semantics. On the other hand, it is fairly clear that the extraordinary coincidence of di erent de nitions we have seen here will not extend to a more general setting.
One point that we have tried to stress throughout this paper is that a general theory which tries to relate parametricity to a form of type abstraction must be able to cope with di ering degrees of abstraction. This should include a trivial form in which everything is concrete. In our opinion this is well modeled by the Moggi-Hyland approach of taking products. We would also, of course, like to see it encompass our form of type abstraction by copying. Finally, it should encompass more general and more practical forms.
Most of the approaches to parametricity fall down by attempting to nd a single correct de nition. One which doesn't fall into this trap is the recent work of Reynolds and Ma MR91] . A relative notion of parametricity emerges in this paper almost as a side-e ect. The authors are interested in carrying out a logical relations approach for a general PLcategory. Now, it is most unlikely that the PL-category itself will contain \enough" relations (it will only contain the ones which are themselves representable as types, but once again this includes the graphs of isomorphisms). The obvious thing to do to get round this is to embed the category of types in some larger category (of sets, say) in which it is possible to nd enough relations. This is what Reynolds and Ma do. Thus they arrive at a notion of parametricity which is de ned relative to a category from which relations are taken. For a strong theory, this may be much larger than the category of types. However, their formalism does not enforce a strict embedding of the category of types in the \larger" relational homeland, but also allows for some collapse. Taken to extreme, they allow one to take relations from the terminal category. This gives a vacuous notion of parametricity, with respect to which every PL-category is parametric.
However, one way in which this approach fails to be as general as possible is to take all relations from a particular category. This prevents Ma and Reynolds from modeling our approach.
Quite recently, the work of Reynolds and Ma has been generalised by O'Hearn and Tennent, attempting to nd a semantics for local variables. O'Hearn and Tennent suggest decoupling the operation of type constructors on relations from their functoriality. Technically this involves using a double category. Their approach can certainly be applied in our setting, where it gives the most general formalism yet.
